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DEPARTMENT FOR EUR/RPM, EUR/ERA AND S/CRS

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TAGS: PREL MCAP MOPS EAID EUN USEU BRUSSELS
SUBJECT: S/CRS ASSESSES THE EU'S CRISIS RESPONSE
CAPABILITIES

Classified By: USEU Political Military Officer Jeremy Brenner for reaso ns 1.4 (b) and (d).

- 11. (C/NF) Summary: The European Union has developed deployable capabilities in police monitoring and training, civil administration, rule of law, and civil protection. Under the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP), there is an evolving capacity to do early warning of failed or failing states or regional conflict combined with an ability to do contingency planning for an integrated crisis response. Some of the missions envisioned within the EU would involve a military component in a range or roles. These structures are developing rapidly, and it is likely that some ESDP missions will be deployed over the next months in order to demonstrate as yet untested capabilities. End Summary.
- 12. (U) John Schmidt, S/CRS Deputy Coordinator for Security and Governance and Tod Wilson, Director of Transitional Security, met January 11 with EU officials for discussions of EU crisis response capabilities. Within the Council Directorate General for External Relations and Common Foreign and Security Policy are Directorates for Civilian Crisis Management and Coordination and for Defense Aspects.

ESDP: Creating a Global and Integrated Crisis Response

13. (C/NF) In a meeting with Didier Lenoir, planner for military aspects of crisis management, Schmidt and Wilson explored the existing structures and capabilities for planning and running an integrated crisis management operation under the European Security and Defense Policy. Lenoir explained that most of the strictly civilian mechanisms for humanitarian relief and reconstruction reside within the European Commission, where there are significant budgets established for ongoing programs. ESDP seeks to create a global and integrated approach to crisis response as part of its security mandate. The 2003 European Security Strategy identified failed states and regional conflicts as key security threats to the EU.

Commission and Council: Two sides of the EU Response

14. (C/NF) According to Lenoir, the ESDP role in crisis response is part of a "grey zone" between the humanitarian competencies of the Commission and the security function of the Council. He explained the division by saying that money spent for the local population comes from the Commission, but deploying people to undertake a mission on the ground is a Council function. While acknowledging that the EU itself is "stovepiped" along these lines, he insisted that within the Council Secretariat there is full coordination among the military and civilian components of crisis response planning. While there are Commission representatives on the newly-created civ/mil planning cell staff within the Secretariat, the cell will not have the authority to draw

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directly upon Commission assets. Its role will be as a central clearinghouse and planning body to coordinate individual member states responses as well as those from within the EU.

The Military Options

15. (C/NF) Lenoir explained that the planning cell will use a watch list as a basis for contingency planning. The cell can be tasked by the Secretariat with preparing a contingency plan for a particular country. He foresees a range of ESDP operations that cover three options. One option would be a military component as part of a civilian humanitarian or stabilization operation. This would entail a logistics and transportation role with planning support for the civilian teams. A second option would involve military units in support of the civilian mission. Such a role would involve the previous elements, but would add a security function. The

third option would be a military operation designed to "kick in the door" and establish a safe and secure environment in order for the civilian operations to be established. The first two options, according to Lenoir, could be planned and run from within the Operations Center, scheduled to be operational in January 2006. The third option of a purely military operation would probably be planned and run at SHAPE.

Missions Defined by End Date, Not End State

16. (C/NF) Lenoir reminded us that the assets that could be marshaled under ESDP are national assets, and as such they could be made available for other operations, such as a request by the UN Security Council. He cautioned that such ESDP operations are conceived as short duration operations, with both an end date and a hand-off to another institution established as part of the planning process. He said that an end-date, rather than an end-state would dictate the termination of the operation, noting that contributing nations are more comfortable in offering assets if they know when it will finish.

DRC Security Sector Reform Mission

¶7. (C/NF) Lenoir told us that planning was going forward quickly on a security sector reform mission in the DRC. Such a mission would involve a military component that would undertake Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) tasks while working to reform the Army and instill principles of good governance. Lenoir anticipated that this may be the next ESDP mission to be deployed.

Civilian Assets

18. (C/NF) Schmidt and Wilson next met with Veronica Cody, Deputy Director of the Directorate for Civilian Crisis Management, and Hannu Taimisto, Rule of Law officer, for an overview of the civilian assets available for crisis response. Cody explained that her directorate coordinates existing resources and seeks to develop additional assets and capabilities on the civilian side of crisis response. civilian experts, like the military forces, are national assets pledged to EU operations by member states. The civilian crisis response directorate encompasses police, rule of law, civil administration, and civil protection resources.

These "instruments" are intended for a range of missions usually focused on monitoring, mentoring, and advising existing local structures. Cody initially ruled out the use of these deployable experts for "substitution" missions, as might be required in an intervention in a failed or failing state where local structures no longer functioned. When pressed, she agreed that circumstances might occur in which these civilian instruments could be used to substitute for local institutions as part of an integrated crisis intervention, perhaps even in conjunction with a military component.

Policing: The Most Advanced Instrument

19. (C/NF) Taimisto pointed out that policing is the most well-developed of the civilian "pillars." With the EU Police Mission in Bosnia and the Proxima mission in Macedonia the mechanisms designed to raise the standard of local policing have had considerable practical experience. Such missions are based on "co-location" of mentors throughout the chain of command to influence policy and management practices. Rule of law missions, such as the current mission to Georgia, are designed around the same principle of co-location.

Civil Administration and Civil Protection

110. (C/NF) Cody pointed out that there has

110. (C/NF) Cody pointed out that there has not yet been a civil administration mission, although there has been some training and exercises. For civil protection, there have not yet been either missions or exercises. She said that national pledges total almost 1000 individuals for civil administration, but it is unclear how rapidly they could be deployed. She envisioned that in a case where records have been destroyed — either deliberately or as the result of a conflict — the civil administration experts could simultaneously substitute for critical services and mentor any remaining parts of the institutions.

Legal Authority for Deployment

111. (C/NF) When asked under what circumstances planners could envision the deployment of these civilian experts, Cody said that such missions have only entered third countries at the request of that government. In principle, in the event of a large crisis response operation mounted under the auspices of a UNSCR, the Council might be able to make its resources available. She pointed out that it would be "cumbersome," and that it would likely entail the launch of an ESDP operation, requiring the approval of the 24 participating Heads of State and Government. (Note: Denmark has opted out of participation in ESDP. End note.)

A Growth Industry

112. (C/NF) Cody said that civilian crisis management is one of the biggest growth areas for the Council, terming it a "boom area." The 2008 Civilian Headline Goal aims to improve the quality and the quantity of rapidly deployable experts. A major objective is to pre-identify specific capabilities at an individual level, and to require a significant level of experience and language proficiency.

Comment

113. (C/NF) The EU member states have contributed billions to the development of these crisis response mechanisms and those programs funded via the Commission. In many respects, this crisis response role represents the lowest common denominator of achievable political consensus among the 24 participating states on the projection of EU "power" and influence. These civilian missions — with their military components — are predicated on a relatively low risk environment, and they would be deployed as limited duration missions with a hand-off mechanism and end date pre-established prior to deployment. The structures are advanced in some respects, but for now, quite limited in scope. As similar crisis response mechanisms evolve within the USG and other international organizations, areas for mutually reinforcing cooperation and coordination will present themselves.

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